Abstract. In this paper we describe how a program constructed for a fault-free system can be transformed into a fault-tolerant program for execution on a system which is susceptible to failures. A program is described by a set of atomic actions which perform transformations from states to states. We assume that a fault environment is represented by a program F. Interference by the fault environment F on the execution of a program P can then be described as a fault-transformation o~ which transforms P into a program ~(P). This is proved to be equivalent to the program P []Pe, where PF is derived from P and F, and D defines the union of the sets of actions of P and Fe. A recovery transformation transforms P into a program ~(P) = P DR by adding a set of recovery actions R, called a recovery program. If the system is fail-stop and faults do not affect recovery actions, we have
I. Introduction
There are several different ways in which a program can be developed using formal rules which guarantee that it will satisfy a specification when executed on a fault-free system (e.g. [Lam83, AbL88, Bac87, Bac88, BaW89, Bac89] ). In this paper, we consider how similar methods can be used to construct fault-tolerant programs for execution on systems which may exhibit any of a set of specified failure properties.
Fault-tolerant programs are required for applications where it is essential that failures do not cause a program to have unpredictable execution behaviours. We assume that the failures do not arise from errors in the program, since methods such as those mentioned above can be used to construct error-free programs. So, the only failures we shall consider are those caused by hardware and system malfunctions. Many such failures can be masked from the program using automatic error detection and correction methods, but there is a limit to the extent to which this can be achieved at reasonable cost in terms of the resources and the time needed for correction.
When the nature or frequency of the errors makes automatic detection and correction infeasible, it may still be possible that error detection can be performed.
It is desirable that fault-tolerant programs are able to perform predictably under these conditions: for example, the program may be executed using memory with single bit error detection and correction, and double bit error detection only. In fact, the provision of good program level fault-tolerance can make it possible to reduce the amount of expensive system error correction needed, as program level error recovery can often be focused more precisely on the damage caused by an error than a general-purpose error correction mechanism.
The task is then to develop programs which perform predictably in the presence of detected system failures, and this requires the representation of such failures in the execution of a program. Earlier attempts to use formal proof methods for verifying the properties of fault-tolerant programs (e.g.
[JMS87],
[HEW88]) were based on an informal description of the effects of faults, and this limits their applicability. Here we shall instead model a fault as an action which performs state transformations in the same way as other program actions, making it possible to extend a semantic model to include fault actions and to use a single consistent method of reasoning about program as well as fault actions.
Let P be a program satisfying the specification Sp. Let the effect of each physical fault in the system on which P is executed be described as a fault action which transforms a good program state into an error state which violates Sp. Physical faults are then modelled as the actions of a fault program F which interferes with the execution of P. A failure at any point during the execution of P takes it into an error state in which a boolean variable f is true. (F is assumed not to change an error state into a good state.) In general, a high level specification of a program is not sufficient to specify its behaviour in the presence of system faults or to transform it into a fault-tolerant program. It is also necessary to describe the hardware organisation of the system on which the program is to be executed, its use of the resources of the system and the nature of the possible faults in the system (e.g. which processors and channels may fail) as all of these factors can affect the execution of the program. And very little can be said about the effects of a system fault on a program until it has been refined to the level where these effects can be observed. There is need to represent faults and their effects at various levels of abstraction and here we shall use specifications to develop both the program and the fault environment in which it executes. Section 2 defines a simple model for representing program actions, fault actions and recovery actions. A specification language is presented in Section 3, with its syntax and semantics. Based on the semantics of failures for a given failure-prone environment, the effect of faults on the original program is defined in terms of a program transformation in Section 4. Section 5 provides an abstract definition of consistency which is used to define recovery transformations which permit both backward and forward recovery. Section 6 shows that the fault-tolerant properties of a program can be refined along with the other properties defined in a program specification. Finally, in Section 7 an example illustrates fault-tolerant programming using the method described in this paper: the problem is to design a protocol that guarantees reliable communication from a sender to a receiver in spite of faults in the communication channel between them.
A Simple Model
This section presents a simple computational model for describing programs, faults and recovery.
Programs
As usual, we describe a program in terms of its variables, states and actions [Lain87] . Program variables are associated with a set of values, called the value space of the program. A state of the program is a mapping from the set of program variables to the value space.
A predicate Q is a function from the set of the program states to the boolean values {true,false}. Thus, given a state S, S satisfies Q (or S has the property Q) if Q(S) is true.
An action A is a relation on the set of states. In other words, an action A is a set of pairs of states. For a pair (S, T) of states, (S, T) c A means that executing A starting in state S can produce (or terminate in) state T. An action thus defines a set of transitions from state to state. An action A is said to be enabled in state S if there is a state T such that (S, T) ~ A. Therefore, for each action A, there is a predicate gA which defines the set of states in which A is enabled. Stated in another way, gA(S) is true iff A is enabled in S. gA is called the guard of A. Let a program P be described as a set Actp of actions and a set Initp of predicates which define the initial states of P. The actions of P are executed atomically: if an action is chosen for execution, it will be executed without interference from the other actions in the program. Such a program P is denoted as (Init p, Act p).
An execution of program P consists of an infinite sequence, So, S~ ..., of states, where So satisfies all the predicates in Initp and each pair (Si, Sg+I) is either in some action of Actp or Si = Si+l. A fixed point of P is a state S such that for any action A E Actp,
VT :(S,T) EA~T=S
An execution, E = So, $1..., of P terminates if it reaches a fixed point, i.e. for some i >_ O, Si is a fixed point of P and hence Sj = Si for any j > i. E is said to be fair for an action A of P, if for any i >_ 0, either there is a j > i such that (Sj, Sj+~) E A or there is a k > i such that gA(Sk) =false.
If P1 and P2 are programs, the union composition program P1 []P2 is defined as
In general, an action of a program is composed of a set of primitive actions.
If A and B are actions, A U B is also an action. Let A o B denote the action which is the composition of the actions A and B.
{(S, T) I 3Tt : ((S, T1) E A)/~ ((T1, T) c B)}
The union operator models choice while the composition of actions models sequential composition in programs.
During the transition from one state to another, defined by an atomic action of program P, the system may pass through a number of intermediate states. 
Concurrency
We can model the parallel execution of a program P = (Inite,Acte) by partitioning its actions Actp among a set Proc --{Pl,---,Pk} of processes, as in Back's concurrent action system [Bac88] . A shared variable is one which is used by two or more actions in different processes, while a private variable is used only by the actions in one process. Two actions of P can be executed in parallel if and only if they are not in the same process and do not share variables. Therefore a concurrent system P with a set Proc of k processes can be written as
where Pi denotes the actions that are assigned to process Pi, 1 <_ i <_ k. In such a concurrent system, processes communicate by executing actions using common variables.
We can also model the parallel execution of P by partitioning its variables Var(P) among its processes Proc (Back's distributed action system [Bac88]). A shared (or joint) action refers to variables in two or more processes, while a private action refers only to variables in one process. Two actions of a distributed system can be executed in parallel if and only if they do not refer to variables in the same process. A distributed system P with a set Proc of k processes can then be written as: [Pnl,..., Pnk,]) where Proc = {Pb...,Pk} is a partition of the variables of P and Aj [Pjt .... ,Pjkj] is an action shared by the processes pjl,...,pjkj in Proc, 1 <_ j <_ n.
An action Aj[pjl ..... Pjkj] is assumed to be executed jointly by the processes {P jl ..... Pjkj} that share the action Aj, and these processes synchronise over the execution of Aj. The action Aj provides communication between the processes: the variables of one process may be updated by Aj in a way that depends on the values of the variables of other processes sharing this action.
A sequential action system is a special case of a parallel action system where all the actions (or all the variables) are assigned to the same process. Another special case is where each action (or each variable) is assigned to a separate process. The program is then executed with maximal parallelism.
We can also view a concurrent action system P =- (Initp,pl[]... ~Pk) as a distributed system, with the private variables of each process p~ being local to the process and the shared variables being partitioned among new processes. Because actions are executed atomically, a parallel computation can be modelled by a sequential computation with interleaved execution of actions. Hence, the set of possible executions of an action system will be the same for a concurrent or a distributed action system and for a sequential action system. This allows us to separate the logical behaviour of processes from implementation issues.
Reasoning About Programs
The Hoare triple {Q}A{R} for an action A means
V(S, T) : ((S, T) c A A Q(S) ~ R(T))
Thus, {Q}A{R} defines the total correctness 1 of action A: when A is executed in a state satisfying Q, it terminates in a state satisfying R. To reason about a program P, A is universally or existentially quantified over the actions of P; a property which holds for all points of the execution of P is defined using universal quantification while a property which holds eventually is defined using existential quantification [Lam87, ChM88] . For example, a safety property of a concurrent program P is defined by an invariant Q so that {Q}A{Q} holds for any action A in Act F.
For any predicate R and action A, the weakest precondition wp(A, R) is defined
wp(A, R)(S) = VT : ((S, T) E A ~ R(T))

Refinement
A program P is said to be refined by program P', denoted P _u U, if each execution of P' is an execution of P. An action A is said to be refined by action A', denoted A E A', if for any Q and R,
{Q}A{R} =~ {Q}A'{R}
The refinement operation is reflexive and two programs (or actions) P and P'
are equivalent, denoted P = p1, if each is refined by the other. 
Modelling Faults
Let P be a program satisfying the specification Sp. The effect of a physical fault in the system on which P is executed can be described as a fault action which 1 This is Hoare logic for total correctness -the original proposal in [Hoa69] used the notation Q{A}R and dealt with partial correctness. transforms a good state into an error state leading to a state which violates Sp. The physical faults in the system can be then modelled as the actions of a fault program F which interferes with the execution of P. A failure during the execution of P takes it into an error state in which a boolean variable f is true.
Assume that a fault may interfere at any point in the execution of P. It might appear that the interference by a fault environment F on the execution of program P can simply be defined by the union composition P[]F of P and F, which would imply that faults occur only before or after, but not during, the execution of an atomic action of P. However, this is clearly a limited view since in practice faults do occur in intermediate states and can lead to failures.
Let P be a program constructed from a set of primitive actions so that each action A E Aetp is constructed from primitive actions using the union and composition of actions. The interference of F on the execution of P can be defined as a transformation ~-, in the following way.
1. For a primitive action A,
~-f (P) = (Init p U {f =false}, {#-(A) [ A E Act p })
Using the algebra of relations, it is easy to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1. For programs P and F, there is a program PF such that
~(P) =--P•PF
We denote ~(P) by P @ F. Assume that this transformation ensures that the execution of P under F is fail-stop [SCS83] , i.e. that no further actions of P will be executed when a failure occurs. The execution of P in the fault environment F is equivalent to the execution of ~(P) in a fault-free environment.
Modelling Recovery
The behaviour of ~(P) will not usually satisfy Sp. To make the program faulttolerant, P must be transformed by a fault-tolerant transformation into a program J(P) such that ~(Y(P)) is expected to satisfy the specification Sp of P. Unfortunately, even this may not always be possible though o~(9--(P)) may be shown to satisfy a weaker but still acceptable specification. The recovery actions of R are enabled only when a failure occurs and transform an error state into a good state which is consistent with the execution sequence interrupted by the fault. We assume that recovery actions are not affected by the fault environment, i.e. that no failure occurs during the execution of a recovery action. Therefore, we have
~-(~(P)) = ff (P)~R = (P O)F)flPR =-P~PFDPR
TO ensure that the recovery program is eventually executed when a fault occurs, the executions of ff(~(P)) must be fair for each action of PR.
Let Po ~ ... C_ Pk be a sequence of program specifications such that Pi v-Pi+l and Pk contains enough information for specifying the fault environment F. From Pk we may be able to determine the number of processes in the program, those which may fail during execution, and the channel variables which are faulty. Based on F and the fault-transformation ff on Pk, we can perform the recovery transformation ~ on Pk and produce the fault-tolerant program Pk~PkR. For example, fault-tolerant mechanisms such as checkpointing, recovery blocks and conversations [BeR81, Ran75, MeR78, KoT87] can then be introduced by applying stepwise refinement to Pk~PkR.
A Specification Language
The specification notation is a combination of Back's action system formalism [Bac88] and a UNITY-like notation [ChM88], and this is defined for the model presented in the previous section. It will be used for reasoning about programs at different levels of abstraction and to provide a sound refinement calculus.
Commands and Actions
A program specification P = (Inite,Actp) is a pair of sets, where Initp is a set of predicates and Acre is a set of action specifications. An action specification A E Acte has the syntactic form g ~ c, where g is a boolean condition and e is a command [Bac88, BaS89] . We use the same symbols for programs and program specifications, and we call a program specification a program, and an action specification an action.
Let gA and cA denote respectively the guard g and the body c of action A, and let the action true ~ c be abbreviated to c when there is no confusion.
A command c is defined as follows, 
Semantics of Commands and Actions
By defining each action specification as an atomic action, the semantics of a program specification is a program in the computational model. Because of this atomicity, a program can be viewed as being sequential and nondeterministic. We assume for simplicity that no abortion occurs in the execution of any command, and that the execution of each command always terminates.
States. Let 
r(IF~=lai)(s)= U r(cAi)(S) gi(S)=true
To guarantee that no abortion occurs, one of the guards gAi must be true in any state S. Semantics ofaaions. The semantics of an action A = g -* c is a function:
Iterative composition: We first define r(AI[]...I3A.)(S)= I.] r(cA~)(S) gi(S)=true
Semantics of programs. For the value space V of program P, let V t be the set of all the finite and infinite sequences 3 over V. An observation 0 of program P is a sequence of states which is defined as the function 0 : Var(P) ~ V ~ satisfying the following conditions:
We use the sequence notation to describe a property of a function from Vat(P) to the sequences Vt; e.g. for the functions 0 and 0 ~, 0"0' is the function such that Obviously, given a command c and an action A, F(c) and F(A) can be extended to be functions over the set OBp of the finite observations of P, e.g.
F(c)(0) = {O'S I S 9 F(c)(last(O))}.
An execution E of P is an infinite observation of P. It is said to exhibit fairness (or justice [MAP83, GeP89] ) if for any i _> 0 and A 9 Actp, either there is a j ~> i 2 The existence of such a fixed point can be proved in set theory. 3 < a,..., b > is the sequence of elements a, ..., b; <> is the empty sequence and < a > ^ < b > is the concatenation of two sequences < a > and < b > such that < a > ^ < b >=< a, b >, < a > ^ <>=< a >, etc.; a'cxza denotes that a / is a prefix of a; alo~ a denotes that a I is a proper prefix of a; #a is the length of the sequence a and #a = co if a is infinite; and a (i --t) is the ith element of a, 1 < i < #a; head(a) and last(a) denote respectively the first and last elements of a non-empty sequence a; tail (a) denotes the sequence obtained from a by removing the first element of a.
such that E(j + 1) E F(A)(E(j)), or there is a k > i such that gA(E(k)) =false.
The semantics of a program P is the set F(P) of its fair executions. Programs P and P' are equivalent if they have the same semantics: p _ p, =a F(P) = F(P') Within this semantic model, P Hskip : P, where skip denotes the program which never changes the values of the program variables. We also use skip to denote a command or action which does not affect program variables. Therefore, this model permits finite stuttering, i.e. in any execution, a state can be repeated consecutively at most a finite number of times before the execution reaches the fixed point of P. The stuttering property is required when dealing with the refinement of reactive programs [Lam83, AbL88, Bac89].
Reasoning About Action Systems
As in Hoare logic [Hoa69, Dij761, the specification {Q}A{R} defines an action A which when executed in a state satisfying predicate Q terminates in a state satisfying predicate R. A is universally or existentially quantified over the actions. 
Fixedpoint(P) iff it is a fixed point of P.
A program specification is written using either UNITY-like logic or an action system formalism. However, we will normally use the logic for high level specification and the action system formalism for the refinement. We assume there is a fairness rule and that the execution of a command always terminates.
Transformations for Specified Faults
The effect of faults on a program P is specified by a program F which defines a set of atomic actions, called fault actions, representing the fault environment.
The execution of the program P under the fault environment specified by F is equivalent to the execution of P together with F on the fault-free system. Such a failure execution of P is defined by the following failure semantics.
Failure Semantics
For a program P and a fault environment F, assume that P has a boolean variable f to indicate the presence of a fault, and that the value of f is never changed in P. Each action A E F is assumed to satisfy 
A failure execution E of a program P w.r.t. F is an infinite failure observation of P. It said to be fair if any action A of P which is continuously enabled at a execution point in E is eventually executed following the failure semantics of A.
The failure semantics of P w.r.t, to F is the set FF(P) of the fair failure executions of P w.r.t. F.
With this definition, the execution of program P can be seen to be fail-stop. Therefore, the failure semantics of the program P can be described in terms of two functions good and error such that each failure observation 0 w.r.t, to F can be written as
= good(O) %rror(O) where good(O) is an observation of P and error(O) is either empty or contains
only error states. Obviously, if there are no faults, i.e. F is empty, each 'failure' execution is the same as some execution of P : F = O => Fr(P) = F(P) Programs P and P' are said to be fault-prone equivalent w.r.t. F if they are equivalent and have the same failure semantics: P' ~ n P' A FF(P) FF(P') P --F = = It should be noted that equivalent programs may not be fault-prone equivalent.
Fault Transformation
Given a program P = AID... DAm and a fault environment F, let f = true if a fault occurs in the execution of P. First, transform P into a program FS(P) such that
FS(P) = FS(A1) D... HFS(Am)
and each FS(Ai) is obtained from Ai by changing gAi into gAi A --~f and every primitive command c which occurs in Ai into the command
FS(c) = if -,f --~ c~f --~ skip fi If c is a primitive command, FS(c) is the primitive f-stop command of c. For a command c of P, FS(c) is an f-stop command which is obtained from c by changing every primitive command c' which occurs in c into the primitive f-stop command FS(c'). Given an action of P
A=g---~ c the f-stop action of A is
FS(A) = ~f A g --+ FS(c)
The execution of FS(P) on a system with the faults F is therefore fail-stop. Obviously, iff is invariantly false, FS(P) --P since P does not change the value off.
For each f-stop command FS(c) and each f-stop action FS(A), a transformation J/l is defined as:
If c is a primitive command,
/Z(FS(c)): if ~f --~ cOT --~ skip[l~f --, F fi
2, Ifc=c~; c2,
dg(FS(c))= Ji(FS(q)); Jd(FS(c2)) if (FS(Cl); FS(c2))[]~f --~ F[]FS(q); (iff --* skip0--,f --* F fi) fi 3. For an action A = g ~ c
Jt(FS(A)) = -,f A g --. JI(FS(c))
For a command c = if AI[]... []An fi,
JC[(FS(c)) = if d/[(FS(A1)) 0... []Jg(FS(An)) [] ~f --* skip fi
If c = do AI[]... []An od,
J/J(FS(c)) = do ~g(FS(A1)) ft... []dJ(FS(An)) od
For the program P = A~ ~... []A,~, we define
JJ(FS(P)) = Jg(FS(A1)) []... []~(FS(A,~))
Given the faults F, the fault transformation is defined as
o~(p) a= ~J(FS(P))
and ~(P) is called the fault affected program of program P, denoted by P @ F.
Theorem 4.1. Given a program P and its fault environment F, the fault-transformation ~ satisfies
F(P (3 F) = FF(P)
Proof From the definitions of observations and failure observations, it is only required to prove that for each state S and an action A = g ---+ c of P,
Fv(A)(S) = F(~C[(FS(A)))(S)
Case 1 : if c is a primitive command, then
FF(C)(S) if ~f Ag(S) = true FF (A) (S)= O otherwise U F(a)(S) u F(c)(S) if-~f Ag(S) = true = acF 0 F(c)(S) u F(F)(S) if o_~ therwise f A g(S) = true O otherwise = F(~f A g ~ c) (S) = F(J/I(FS(A)))(S) Case 2 " if c = c1
Fr(A)(S)= ;c2 and FF(Ci) -~ F(.///[(FS(ci)) for i= 1,2, then
FF(q)(FF(e2)(S)) if -~f A g(S) ---true O otherwise F(~(FS(c,)))(F(~(FS(c2))(S)) if -~f A g(S) = true O otherwise F(JC[(FS(cl));Mg(FS(c2)))(S) if -~f A g(S) = true
O otherwise F(Jg(fS(cl ; c2))(S) if -~f A g(S) = true O otherwise = F(--f Ag --~ Mg(FS(cl ; e2)))(S) =
F(J/[(FS(A)))(S)
Case 3 
Fv(ci)(S) if--,f A g(S) = true
FF (A)(S)= ~,(s)=true
O if --,f A g(S) = false = F(~f A g ~ if dg(FS(At))[]..
. []dg(FS(A,))[]f ~ skip fi)(S) = F(~(FS(A)))(S)
Case 4 : the proof for the case of iterative composition is similar to Case 3.
[] Corollary 4.1. Given a program P and its faults F,
F=O~P@F=P
Therefore, a fault-free execution of the program P @ F is a fault-prone execution of program P and vice versa, and P @ F is equivalent to P if no fault occurs. Further, as shown in the following theorem, P @ F is equivalent to the union composition of the f-stop program FS(P) with a program PF.
Theorem 4.2. Given P and F, there is a program PF such that
P @ F =--FS(P)~PF
Proof. Let P = A10... OAn, Ai -= gi ---> ci. We prove that for each Ai, there is an action F~ such that
dg(FS(AO) =--~f A gi ~ if FS(cAi)DFi fi
Case 1 9 if ci is a primitive command,
JCZ(FS(Ai))= --,f A gi --~ JC[(FS(ci))
= -~f A gi ~ if -.f ---> c[]f ~ skip[]-~f ~ F fi ---~f A gi --> if FS(ci)[]--,f A gi -~ F fi
Case 2 9 if ci = c; c', then 
dg(FS(Ai))= -,f A gi ~ Jd(FS(c; c'))
= ~f A gi --+ if (FS(c); FS(d))[]-,f ~ F[]FS(c); (if f --+ skip O-'f --> F fi) fi)
=-~f A g, -+ FS (c; c') D-'f --+ FI]FS(e); (iff --~ skipU--f --+ F fi) fi)
Case 3" if ci = if AilO ... OAi,, fi, and X-d(FS(Aij)) --FS(Aij)~Fi], ~g(FS(Ai))= -~f A gi --~ if J~(FS(ail))fl... fl~/~(FS(aini)
)
. []~f A gAn -* if FS(cAn)~Fn fi FS(AI)N-~f A gI --~ FI[] ... []FS(An)~f A gn --~ Fn -FS(A~fl ... HA~)H-~f Agl -:, Ft ... H-~f Ag, ---> F~ = FS(P)~f Agl -~ F1... O~f Ag~ --> F, []
The fault transformation defined above is based on the assumption that each fault action in F may interrupt the execution of any action in P. Such an assumption simplifies the presentation of the failure semantics, the fault transformations and the discussion of their properties. But this assumption is not essential for the results obtained in this section. It may be possible that an action in P is interrupted by only a subset of the fault actions in F.
For a program P = A1 H... HAn, Ai = gi "+ ci, let
FS (Ai) = ~f A, A gi --~ FS (ci)
where 
Af <1 Ai ~ 3fj : {-~fj}Af{fj} A (fj ~ fA,)
where A T E F and {f~}Af{fg} for/= 1 ..... n. Let FA~ be the set of fault actions in F which interrupt action A~,
FA, A {A T [ a I E F AAT ~ Ai}
Then Ai @ FAt is defined as:
Ai O) F& A -~f A~ A g ~ ,///[(FS(ci))
where dg (FS(ci) ) is obtained by applying to the command ci the transformations FS and ~' w.r.t, fi and FA,. The fault affected program ~-(P) is then defined as:
if ( 
Consistency and Recovery Transformation
Let P~F be the fault affected version of a program P and P0 _ ... _ Pk = P be a sequence of refinements. When the execution of P 09 F reaches an error state it will stay in that state forever and no further action in P can be executed. Therefore, the behaviour of P ~ F will not in general satisfy the original specification P0, i.e. P ~ F does not refine P0. To make the execution of P recoverable from an error state, the system has to be restored to a good state from which the interrupted execution can resume. Such a good state can be described in terms of consistency with the execution of P.
Reachability and Consistency
For any state S of a program P, let Reach(S) be the set of states which are reachable from S by executing P, i.e.
Reach(S) a= {S,130, O, E OBp 9 S = last(O) A S' = last(O') A OocO'}
Let
Reachable(S,S') in P A S' E Reach(S)
and, as an abbreviation,
Reachable(S) in P ~= Reachable(inite, S)inP
Let 0 be a finite observation of P. S is a possible future state of P for 0, if there is an observation of P which extends 0 to S, i.e. S is forward consistent (ForwCon) with 0:
ForwCon(S,O) A Reachable(last(O),S)
Let f be a set of disjoint subsets of Var(P) and W = {Sx ! X E ~r}, where Sx is a substate over X. We say that T is forward-consistent with 0, if there exists a state S such that
VX E ~r : Six = Sx A ForwCon(S,O)
We may consider a "state" as the union of sub-states previously reached at different points in this execution, provided that this "state" could have been reached in some execution of P. If the execution can continue from this state, then it is consistent.
Let 
Consistent(S, O) A ForwCon(S, O) V BackwCon(S, O)
When there is no confusion, we will simplify the definitions and notation by omitting O, e.g. Consistent(S).
Recovery Transformation
To resume the execution of P after interruption by fault actions in F, P has to be transformed into a program ~(P) by adding a set of recovery actions PR called a recovery program.
Let ob be an auxiliary variable whose value space is the set of observations ofP ~F
: Var(P)
, V t where 0[i] is a good state for each i < #0.
A state predicate Q over Var(P) is extended to be a state predicate Qob over Var(P) U {ob} such that for a state S over Vat(P) u {ob}, Qob(S) = true if
Q(Slvar(P)) A Vx E Var(P) " last(ob)(x) = S(x)
For 0 and 0' in the value space of ob, let Ext(O, 0') = true if
3S ~ tPV, r(p) " VX ~ Var(P) " O(x) = O'(x) ^ < S(x) >
The predicate ForwExt(O, 0') = true if ForwCon(last(O), 0') A O' ocO.
The predicate BackwExt(O, 0') = true if BackwCon(last(O), 0') A O' ~__bcO.
We define
Now let the specifications of P and F over Vat(P) be transformed into specifications over Vat(P) U {ob} so that:
1. Each {Q A ~f}A{R} in P is transformed into 
~(~(P)) --~(P)[]PR --FS(P)[]PR[]PF
~(~(P)) should ideally satisfy the specification P0. Unfortunately, it is not usually possible to have such a strong transformation for an arbitrary program P and arbitrary faults F. However, we can often have a recovery transformation such that ~(~(P)) is weaker than P0 but acceptable in terms of its behaviour and F = O =~ ~-(~(P)) --P Two kinds of error recovery are used in practice [AnL81]. With backward error recovery, the system recovers from a fault by starting from a state which is consistent with its previous states. Forward recovery is used when a program has to recover from an error whose effects can either not be overcome by backward recovery or (in a real-time program) because the time constraints do not permit backward recovery. As in the case of backward recovery, for forward recovery the variables Var(P) have to be assigned values so that the state S is good (i.e. f is false) and forward consistent with the current observation ob.
The recovery transformation N can apply to both backward and forward recovery and this shows that in principle backward and forward recovery methods can be both used in the same fault-tolerant system. Backward and forward recovery programs are special cases of PR and specified as PBR and PFR respectively:
where obo is the value of ob before the execution of PR.
Using Refinement for Fault-Tolerance in Programs
The recovery transformation t~ (or the recovery program Pc) describes what should be done for recovery but imposes no restrictions on when PR is executed, where it is executed (e.g. on which processor) or how it is to be executed (e.g. how to find a consistent state). These restrictions can be introduced by using transformations on P []PR which will be described in terms of F-refinement.
Given a fault environment F, program P' is said to F-refine program P (denoted as P _e P') if (P E_ p') A (P' Sat (f , , ~f)) and for each execution E of ~(P') in which there are finitely many error states of which E[k] is the last,
is an execution of P'.
As for the equivalence of fault-prone programs, it is not necessarily the case that P _F P' if P' refines P. However, the following results are easily proved: Theorem 6.1. Given programs P, P', P" and a fault environment F, 1. P ~__F ~(P)
P ~F P' EF P" ~ P E_.F P"
3. P ___ P' ~ ~(P) E_F ~(P') 4. P E P' ~ P E_v 9~ (P') Proof This comes directly from the definition of F-refinement and the specification of the transformation ~.
[] The first two results show that fault-tolerance is introduced and preserved by F-refinement transformations. From the next two results, it can be seen that refinement transformations can be applied to the original program and faulttolerance introduced after that, using F-refinement. Corollary 6.1. Given a program P and a fault environment F,
PR E PR' =v ~(P) U__ F P []PR, 2. P E_F :~(P) E_F P []PBR 3. P U_F ~l(P) E F P []PFR
As an example of the first result in Corollary 6.1, let So be the initial state of program P and Program PR, :
(f ~ X := So ; f := false) End{Pg,)
then (PR U__ PRO A (P _UF P []PR _f P []PRO
Program P []/JR' is a fault-tolerant program such that whenever a fault occurs, the execution of P will recover by re-starting from its initial state [JMS87, Hell87] .
The following theorem introduces a useful F-refinement rule. 
M(P) E_F Mr(P) 2. I c_ j ~ ~r(P) E_F ~':(P)
The next theorem provides a rule to allow a recovery action to be freely introduced at any point in the program. 
~r (P) C_ v (E) ~i (P) [AI/A'i']
It is noted that for any command c c --skip;c ----c;skip
And we assume here that the fault environment of skip is always empty:
~-(c) ----~(skip; c) ------~-(c; skip)
We can therefore introduce the recovery action PR (and its refined versions), by replacing such a skip with PR, at any suitable place.
A program P can be refined using rules of the form defined by Back [BaS88] , and then Theorem 6.1 can be used to add F-refinement. Checkpointing actions can then be added to P (or the refined version of P) by introducing new variables and assignments [BaS88, Mor90] . Then, following Theorem 6.2 and Theorem 6.3, recovery actions can be introduced at appropriate points. The choice of recovery point may follow well-known practice, e.g. by using recovery blocks or conversations. It can be shown that the checkpointing and recovery protocol suggested by Koo and Toueg [KoT87] can also be achieved by using F-refinement.
It may be noticed that Theorem 6.2 and Theorem 6.3 also hold for any program PR' ~F PR.
Example: a Protocol for Communication Over Faulty Channels
In this section, we consider an example of fault-tolerant programming using the methods presented in this chapter. The problem is to design a protocol that guarantees reliable communication from a sender to a receiver in spite of faults in the communication channel between them. In the following programs, we shall omit the declaration and initial values of the variables if they are clear from the context.
The Sender process produces an infinite sequence mso of data. The Receiver process reads in a sequence mr satisfying the following specification:
invariant mrocmSo (i.e. mr is a prefix of mso) #mr = n ~ > #mr = n + 1 (i.e. the length of mr increases eventually)
If the sender and the receiver communicate over an unbounded reliable FIFO channel c, the communication between them can be implemented using the program Sender-Receiver. 
End {Sender-Receiver}
The FIFO channel c can be implemented as the following program: Hence mrocms is invariant.
Program C initially
To prove the progress property #mr = n, > #mr = n -t-1 :
Discussion
Assume that P0 = Sp is the top level specification of a program in a UNITY-like notation. The top level specification of the fault environment F0 can be given as ~f, , f P0 can be then refined into an action system P1 while F0 can be simulated (or refined) by an action system F1 consisting of one action Thus, in principle, a fault-tolerant program can be produced from its fault-free specification by using F-refinement rules. We do not underestimate the difficulty of doing this in practice, but the rules provided here do offer a formal means of verifying what is otherwise left to less precise methods of reasoning. Each step in the refinement P0 E ... E Pk r-... provides more information about the system on which the program is to be executed, and similar information about the faults of the system is used for refining the fault specification. For certain programs and faults, e.g. Sender-Receiver and the faulty channels, the boolean variable f which indicates the presence of faults in/7o can be derived from the state predicates of program Pk at a suitable stage in the refinement. But it is an open question whether this is always possible for any program and any set of possible faults.
With the fail-stop assumption, it is not necessary to have special states for abortion and non-termination if it is assumed that each action of the original program always terminates. However, without the fail-stop assumption [Liu91], it must be assumed that faults may cause abortion or non-termination within an action even if the action always terminates in a fault-free environment.
The logic used for reasoning about programs is based on a built-in fairness condition, known as strong fairness [MAP83, GeP89] . The logic itself is too weak to express this or any other fairness condition [Fra86] . But, as we have seen in the previous sections (and elsewhere [Liu91] ), the logic is sufficient for describing at a relatively high level the basic principles of fault-tolerant refinement and transformation. It would be interesting to examine the use of a more powerful logic, such as Lamport's temporal logic of actions (TLA) [Lam90, Lam91], for further work in this direction. There are extensions of Back's refinement calculus for dealing with refinement of parallel programs [Bac89], and in [Liu91] we show how this can be used for fault-tolerant refinement of parallel programs. Fault-tolerant systems often also have real-time constraints. So it is important that the timing properties of a program are refined along with the fault-tolerant and functional properties defined in a program specification. If we extend the model used in this paper by adding timing properties in some time domain [JOG88] , the recovery transformation can be defined with timing constraints. The specification and refinement of the recovery actions can then be required to satisfy the condition that after a fault occurs, the system is restored to a consistent state within a time bound which includes the delay caused by the execution of the recovery action. Thus the method described in this paper can be extended to take account of timing constraints. However, there are numerous problems still to be examined in making such a method practical, and these are the goals of further work.
The idea that a hardware fault be modelled as another kind of action (operation) that performs state transformations was described in [Cri85] through an example. There, processor crashes and faults that affect the physical storage medium are taken to be special operations, referred to fault operations, and described by axioms similar to those used to describe the semantics of ordinary operations. As we have seen in this paper, developing this idea into a general method for systematically constructing fault-tolerant programs is far from trival.
We have attempted this by defining transformations of programs, because this enables us to discuss formally the fault-tolerant properties of a program at different level of abstraction.
